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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

REGINALD WILLIAMS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Case No. 20140623-CA

V.

@

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents/Appellees.

RESPONSE BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This action challenges the conditio_ns of the petitioner's confinement and comes
within this Court's original jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2).(f) (West
ViJ

Supp. 2014).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. The Utah State Prison (Prison) provides its inmates with contract attorneys to
assist inmates in drafting and filing initial pleadings in civil rights actions regarding
current confinement or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Carper v. DeLand, 54 F .3d
I~

613, 617 (10 th Cir. 1995). Williams' Second Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief
(SAP) claims that this legal assistance is constitutionally inadequate. Did the trial court

err in holding that the Prison had no duty to provide any further legal assistance to
Williams?
PRESERVATION and STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court based its

dismissal of most of Williams' SAP on this issue. R. 758-62. The trial court's decisions
on questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869
P.2d 945,947 (Utah App. 1995).
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Williams' motion to
disqualify the Utah Attorney General's Office?
PRESERVATION and STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court entered its

ruling on this issue on January 21, 2014. R. 641-54. Trial judges have considerable
discretion in deciding motions-to disqualify.attorneys and their decisions will only be
overturned when that discretion is exceeded. State v. LoPrinzi, 2014 UT App 256, ,I 9,
338 P.3d 2,53.
3. Did the trial court err in denying Williams' bill of costs?
PRESERVATION and STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court entered its

ruling on this issue on May 6, 2014. R. 696-97. Generally an award of costs is within the
sound discretion of the trial court, but questions of whether there has been compliance
with the mandatory procedures for seeking costs will be reviewed for correctness. Brown
v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, ·111, 136 P.3d 1252.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

There are no determinative statutes or rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Williams filed his petition for extraordinary relief, independent action, petition for
review of records denial on July 21, 2011. R. 1-34. Williams also filed a motion to
recuse (disqualify) the Utah Attorney General's Office from representing the Prison in
this matter. R. 105-11. Without deciding the motion to recuse, the trial court dismissed
this matter on December 13, 2011. R. 263-67. Williams appealed, and this Court
:.iJ

reversed and remanded. R. 311-12; Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 2013 UT App 159,306
P.3d 821. This Court awarded Williams his costs incurred on appeal that were to be
determined by the trial court. R. 515-17. On May 6, 2014, the trial court denied
Williams' bill of cost as being untimely, and not being itemized nor verified. R. 696-97.
The trial court denied Williams' motion to disqualify on January 21, 2014. R. 64155. Williams filed a second am~nded petition (SAP) on June 2, 2014. R. 704-25. The
trial court dismissed the SAP on July 1, 2014, without serving it on the respondents. R.

~

757-66. Williams timely filed the present appeal.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Access to the Courts

The Department of Corrections' administrative rules provide access to the courts
for the Prison's inmates through contract attorneys. Utah Admin. Code R251~707-3(4)

3

("the primary means of access to legal services shall be p~ovided by contract attorneys
paid by the Department"). The rules also limit what legal assistance will be provided by
thes·e contract attorneys.
It is the policy of the Department that: ( 1) legal assistance shall be
provided to assist inmates in preparing and filing of an initial pleading in
habeas and civil rights suits challenging conditions of confinement arising
from incarceration at the prison;
Id. at (I).
The rules do not call for any other legal assistance to be provided as. an alternative
to that specified in the rules.
Motion to Disqualify

On March 30, 2011, before.this matter was filed, Assistant Attorney General
Matthew B. Anderson realized that he had given Williams copies of two documents that
were protected by GRAMA and should not have been disclosed. 1 R. 417, 451-53, 645.
Williams' legal pouches were taken, unopened, to the Warden's office. Id. The Prison's
contract attorneys inspected the legal pouches to divide the materials in those that were
legal-privileged (and could not be searched by the respondents) and those that were legalpublic (such as case law, rules of procedure, legal books, pleadings filed with a court,
etc., that could be searched ~y the respondents). R. 433,646. Contract attorney Wayne

1

These documents are identified in the record as the "Chase proposal" and the
"Shreve letters." R. 649.
4

A. Freestone determined that all of the material in Williams' legal pouches was legalpublic, and none of it was legal-privileged. R. 403, 646.
Assistant Attorney General Anderson, in the presence of Warden Bigelow, then
searched Williams' legal-public materials to retrieve the documents he had inadvertently
given to Williams. R. _419, 498. He did not read or even skim most of the documents. R.
419.
Bill of Costs .

This Court awarded Williams his costs incurred on appeal. R. 515. This Court
vil

furthered ordered that Williams file, with the trial court, an itemized and verified bill of
costs incurred on appeal within 15 days after remittitur to the trial court. Id. The
reqiittitur was filed with the trial court on September 16, 2013. R. 553. Williams' bill of
cost was not filed until October 17, 2013. R. 591-608. The bill of cost does not include a
certificate of service, though it is dated September 18, 2013. R. 592.
The trial judge noted that:
Although Petitioner included a mailing certificate, dated October 9,
2013, with his Response to Respondents' Objection to First Amended
Petition, dated September 30, 2013, which followed his last exhibit to his
Bill of Costs, Petitioner did not include a mailing certificate for his Bill of
Costs.
R. 696 at n.6.
• While providing pages of his inmate account statement as exhibits .(R. 594-602).
Williams failed to state what amount of costs he sought (R. 592) and did not identify

5

which transactions found in his exhibits related to his costs incurred on appeal. Only after
respondents' objections to Williams' bill of costs was filed (R. 609-11 ), did Williams
provide the amount of costs he sought. R. 618. But Williams still failed to explain how
he arrived at the claimed amount of costs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Williams, as an inmate, has a right to access to the courts. But this right is limited.
The Prison is not required to provide legal assistance beyond helping Williams with the
preparation of initial pleadings in civil rights and habeas corpus matters regarding his
current confinement.
The Prison's. contract attorneys are not required to assist Williams in other legal
matters. They are not required to prepare notices of claim for tort actions .or other legal
proceedings. The Prison does not have a duty to assist Williams· in doing his own legal
research or providing copies of legal material through its contra~t attorneys.
Even a failure to provide adequate access to the courts would not.state a claim
against the Prison. Williams would also have to show that he had been actually injured.
This he failed to do. The trial court did not err in denying Williams' access to the courts
claims.
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Williams' motion to
disqualify the Utah Attorney General's Office. There was no evidence that any legalprivileged documents were searched in the effort to retrieve the documents that had been

6

G

erroneously provided to Williams. Williams failed to show how this search should lead to
""

the disqualification of the entire Utah Attorney General's Office.
Williams' bill of costs was filed untimely. It did not state the amount of costs
sought. It did not identify which of many transactions in the records provided Williams
believed were related to his appeal. When Williams finally provided the amount of costs
he sought, filed with his reply, he still failed to identify any specific information to
support his claim. The trial court's denial of his bill of costs should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I. WILLIAMS' RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS WAS NOT
VIOLATED
An inmate's right of access to the courts requires the prison to provide either
~

adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, but not
both. Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613, 616 (10 th Cir. 1995) (upholding the Utah State
Prison's access to the courts plan as meeting the constitutional needs of Utah's inmates).
This duty to supply assistance applies only to the preparation and filing of initial .
pleadings in civil rights actions concerning current conditions of confinement or a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 617 ("Further, an inmate's right of access does
not require the state to supply legal assistance beyond the preparation of initial pleadings

~

in a civil rights action regarding current confinement or a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.").
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The Utah State Prison provides its inmates assistance by contracting with persons
trained in the law to meet this duty. R. 760~ Utah's program has been upheld as meeting
the constitutional requirements by the United States Tenth Circuit Court in Carner and in
Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397 (10 th Cir. 1987) (Utah did not need to provide
illiterate inmate with assistance beyond the initial pleading stage). The trial court
properly denied Williams' claims that he had a constitutional right to further legal
assistance. No such right exists.
Williams has no constitutional right to unlimited free photocopies. R. 705-06.
The Prison has no duty to provide anything more than legal assistance in the preparation
and filing of initial pleadings in a civil rights action regarding current confinement or a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial judge correctly held that there was no duty
to assist Williams in filing ORAMA requests (R. 764) or other proceedings. The trial
court ·correctly rejected WiHiams ~ccess to courts claims on th~ merits. R. 758-64.
To state a claim of denial of access to the courts, Williams would also be required
to show that he had suffered actual injury. Lewis v. Casey~ 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
The trial judge correctly noted that:
To satisfy the "actual injury" requirement a petitioner must show "that the
denial oflegal resources hindered the prisoner's efforts to pursue a
nonfrivolous claim." Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 {10th Cir.
1996).
R. 761.

8

Williams failed to demonstrate that: I) he was denied legal assistance in the filing
\rj)

of an initial pleading in a civil rights claim concerning his current incarceration or a
habeas corpus petition; and, 2) that a claim that he was hindered in the pursuit of a nonfrivolous claim.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING WILLIAMS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE UTAH
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

Williams motion to disqualify the entire Utah Attorney General's Office is based
on his unsupported allegations concerning a search of his inmate legal pouch. Williams
~

has not shown what legal-privileged documents were supposedly seized by Assistant
Attorney General Matthew B. Anderson.
Contract attorney Wayne A. Freestone determined that all of the material in the
legal pouches in question was legal-public, and none of it was legal-privileged. R. 403,
646. No privileged documents were given to Mr. Anderson in his effort to retrieve the
Shreve and Chase documents that he had erroneously provided to Williams.
The trial court reviewed those few documents presented to it by Williams and

~

found that most were not privileged. R. 643-50. The trial court found that the undisputed
facts showed that no protected documents had been disclosed to Mr. Anderson. R. 650.
The trial court explained that it was not provided by Williams with the documents
that Williams referred to, such as unfiled complaints. R. 643. This is not a situation
where an attorney who previously represented Williams .had now joined an opposing law

9

firm or government agency. State v. McClellan, 2009 UT 50,216 P.3d 956. Even there,
the Supreme Court rejected a per se rule of disqualification and permitted the
presumption to be rebutted. Id. at ,r 19.
Williams has not addressed the trial court's actual grounds for denying Williams'
motion to disqualify. The trial court held that there had been no violation of either Rules
1.9, 1.10, or 1.11 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. R. 651-63. Disqualification
was not proper where "neither Mr. Anderson, nor any other member of the AG, has
represented or is currently representing [Williams] in the entitled manner." R. 653.

III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED WILLIAMS'
UNTIMELY AND INADEQUATE BILL OF COSTS
Having granted Williams cost incurred in his appeal (Williams v. Department of
Corrections, 2013 UT App 159,306 P.3d 821), this Court ordered Williams to file his
itemized and verified bill of costs incurred on appeal within 15 days after remittitur to the
trial court. R. 515. The remittitur was filed with the trial court on September 16, 2013.
R. 553. Williams' bill of cost was not filed until October 17, 2013. R. 591-608. The bill
of cost does not include a certificate of service, though it is dated September 18, 2013. R.
592.
The timely filing of a bill of costs is mandatory. Utah R. App. P. 34(d). Indeed,
this Court expressly stated in its order that "[Williams] shall serve upon the State and file
with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified bill of costs incurred on appeal,
within 15 days after remittitur~" R. 515. Dealing with Utah Civil Procedure Rule 54(d)
10

(requiring that a party claiming costs in the trial court "must within 14 days after the entry
of judgment serve". his claim for costs upon the adverse parties and the court), this Court
has held that the untimely filed claim for costs must be denied. Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006
UT App 168, ,r 27,136 P.3d 1252.
Nor can Williams rely on Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 2l{f) relating to
papers filed by inmates. Rule 21 (t) applies only if the paper is "deposited in the
institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing." Williams failure to
provide a certificate of mailing precludes this Court from knowing when the bill of costs
was mailed.
Moreover, Williams did not comply with Rule 21(f)'s requirement that timely
filing be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration "setting forth the date of
'\ti}

deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid." Id. No such document
appears in the record. Nothing indicates how or when the bill of costs was sent to the trial
court. The trial court did not err in rejecting Williams' bill of costs as untimely.
While providing pages of his inmate account statement as exhibits (R. 594-602).
Williams' bill o_f costs failed to state what amount of costs h~ sought (R. 592) and did not
identify which transactions found in his exhibits related to his costs incurred on appeal.
Only after respon~ents' objections to Williams' bill of costs was filed (R. 609-11), did
Williams provide the amount of costs he sought. R. 618. But Williams still failed to
demonstrate how he arrived at the amount he claimed as costs. The trial court did not

11

abuse its discretion in denying Williams' bill of costs. Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App
168, 1 11, 136 P.3d 1252.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, respondents/appellees ask this Court to affirm the
challenged decisions of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted this /

J.Jdday of April, 2015.

~~-~

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Response
Brief of Respondents/Appellees, postage prepaid, to the following on this /.5.Y( day
of April, 2015:
Reginald Williams
Inmate # 4620
UTAH STATE PRISON
P. 0. Box250
Draper, UT 84020
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ADDENDUM ''A''

IF~\~l!lrd
JJ ,us·~i~_ac...mma'
Jud1c1al District·
JAN 2 1 2014
8

SALT lAKE COUNTY
Oaputy Cieri<

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
REGINALD WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
vs.

RULING
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, ALFRED C. BIGELOW,
STEVE TURLEY, CRAIG BALLS,
LARRY BUSSIO, MICHELLE ·
BARTLETT, CAPTAIN GARDNER, MIKE
HADDON, THOMAS PATTERSON,
GINA PROCTOR, GARY SESSIONS,
DAVID J. ANGERHOFFER, WAYNE A.
FREESTONE, and MATTHEW B.
ANDERSON,
.

Case No. 110918680
Judge: L.A. DEVER

Respondents.
The above matter is before the Court- on Petitioner's Request to Submit for

Decision his Motion to (1) Disqualify Counsel, (2) Sever Claims, and (3} Amend
·Petition; and Petitioner's Motion for Award of-Costs, fifed November 18, 2013. Having
reviewed Petitioner's Petition and Respondents' Opposition thereto, and being duly
~

advised of the premises of each, the Court makes the following Ruling.
Because the Utah Court of Appeals has advised that Petitioner's Motion to
Disqualify be "disposed"1 of before proceeding to the merits of Petitioner's claims,
Williams v. Dep1 of Corr., 2013 UT App 159, 1J 6, 306 P.3d 821, this Court shall

1

This Court interprets the Court of Appeal's suggestion that a final disposition must be rendered
on said matter before this Court may proceed to address any of Petitioner's other claims. Accordingly, all
other matters submitted for consideration are HEREBY STAYED pending the final disposition of
Petitioner's Motion ·to Disqualify Counsel.
·

-ILf

1

address, at ·this time, Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify Counsel.
Background
Petitioner originally filed his Motion to· "Recusen2 on October 4, 2011, in
conjunction with his Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner requests
that the Office of the Utah State Attorney General ("AG") be disqualified. (Pet'r's Opp.
to Mol to Dismiss, Mot. to Recuse, 6). Petitioner asserts that on March 31, 2011, the
Utah Department of Corrections ("UDC") officials confiscated his "legal materials113 and
provid~d them to Assistant Attorney General Matthew B. Anderson4• Respondent.'
(Pet'r's Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Mot. to Recuse, 2). Petitioner further alleges that Mr.
Anderson "search[ed) and read [his] legal rnaterials including unfifed complaints,_ letters
to attorneys and work-product preparation of future legal actions." Id. (citing Pet. 3R-

3S5). After Mr. Anderson allegedly read Petitioner's legal materials, he contact~
Virginia Smith of Zions Bank "regarding oth~ issues contained in [Petitioner's] untiled
~mpl~int against Zions Bank." ·1d. at 6. Petitioner contends that due to M_r.
Anderson's search and review of his legal materials, Respondents were given an "unfair ·.
advantage in defending themselves against [Petitioner's] claims in this action. Id.
ff

2
Petitioner misconstrues the tenn recuse." In the context of Petitioner's Motion, Petitioner was
requesting the <;:ourt to "disqualify" the relevant party as counsel.
11

3

Petitioner does not specify the particular legal materials that were divulged. See also fn. 2.

· "Mr. Anderson serves In the AG's Cri~inal Justice DiVislon, Corrections S~on, representing th~
UOC. (Anderson Deel. at 3).
5

~n his Petition, Petitioner alleges that after Mr. An<:lerson reviewed his legal materials he
contacted Virginia Smith of Zions Bank and •reported details only ~vailable fn Petitioner's legal materials.·
(Pet'r's Pet 3S). The only specific documents Petitioner refers to are the "Chase proposar and "Shreve
letters.• Id. at 3R, 3S.
.
_.

2
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In his M9tion and related Memorandum in Support. filed August 6, 2013,
Petitioner requests that the Court "should disqualify the entire Utah Attorney General's
Office and the contractorfrom further participation in this action for breech (sic] of
confidentiality(.]" (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 3-5)(emphasis added). Petitioner in this
instance, asserts that Mr. Anderson initiated the confiscation, reviewed his legal
materials and thereafter seized seventy-seven {77) doc~ments. Id. at 3-4. Petitioner
also asserts that the contractor, David J. Angerhoffer6, searched and read his legal
materials.

Discussion
The Court finds that Petitioner's arguments fail as follows.

1

The Work Product Doctrine

First. Petiti~ner fails to specify the documents in his "legal materials" that are
privileged work product. As noted above, in Petitioner's Motion

to Recuse he refers

·generally to his "legal materials including unfiled complaints, letters· to attorneys and

work-product preparation of future. legal actions/' (Pet'r's Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Mot
to Recuse, 2) (citing Pet. 3R-3S7), but does not provide to the Court, with either the
filing of his initial Petition or his Motion to Recuse, a work product log or an in camera
submission8 of materials he considers privileged, leaving the Court to speculate as to
6

Mr. Angerhoffer is also a Respondent in the entitled matter.

7
The only specific documents Petitioner refers to in his Petition are the Chase proposal· and
•Shreve letters.• (Pefr's Pet 3R, 3S).
11

8

Petitioner, with.his.September 12, 2013, submitted six.(6) exhibits for In camera review. These
Include three (3) memoranda from the contract attorneys to Petitioner, two (2) letters to the contract
attorneys from Petitioner, and a single undated handwritten list by an un~own author. The noted
3

... -
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the type/nature of said. claimed documents. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Automated Geographic Reference Ctr.• Div. of Info. Tech., 2008 UT 88, 1[29, 200 P.3d
643 ("(M]aking an in camera submission of materials -that counsel· contends are
privileged is a practice both long-standing and routine in cases involving claims of
privilege." (citation and quotations omitted)). Moreover, Petitioner fails to establish the
grounds on which his "legal materials" qualify as privileged work product. Id. (explaining
in relevant part, that the party seeking to assert the work product privilege has the
burden of establishing that such is applicable (citations omitted)).
The l\vork product doctrine covers both fact work product and opinion work
11

product. Id. at ffll 24-31. For materials to be protected under the first branch of .the

work product doctrine, the material(s) at issue must (1) co~sist of documents or tangible
things, (2) be prepared in anticipation of_litigation or-for trial, and (3) be prepared by or
fQr another party or by or for that party's representative.

~old Standard~-. Inc. y.. A~ .

...Barrick Res; Corp., 805 P.2d -164, 168 (Utah 1990) (citing U.R.C.P•. 26(b)(3)9). "Thafis,
_protection for work product extends only to material that would not have been
generated but forthe pendency or imminence of litigation." S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,

2008 UT at 1J 25 (citations and quotations omitted)(emphasis added).
As for the second branch, opinion work product generally applies to those
Adocuments (which] convey the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal

materials do not refer or even Identify the •chase proposal11 or •shreve letters, 11 which Petitioner cites, both
In his. Petition{Pefr's:Pet. 3R, 3S) and his Motion to Recuse, were the alfeged •confiscated" documents.
9The current version is reflected In Ruie 26(b)(5).
4
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theories of an attorney or party." Gold Standard I. 805 P.2d at 168.
Before the Court considers Petitioner's "legal materialsn pursuant to the work
product doctrine, the Court recounts the relevant history as provided by the parties,
leading to the· alleged reading, review and/or seizure of Petitioner's claimed legal
materials.

1.

On March 30, 201 ·1, Mr. Anderson discovered that he had inadvertently

disclosed certain confidential GRAMA protected documents to Petitioner
in response to Petitioner's GRA~ requests. (Resp't's Opp. to Pet'r's
Mot. vii)(citing An~erson Deel. at 16).

2.

Mr. Anderson addressed the inadvertent disclosure with then Deputy
Director Robyn Williams and Steve Turley, Director of lnstitutio•nal
Operations. Therea~er; in conjunction with UDC policy, Mr. Turley
decided to retrieve the documents at issue._ Id. at viii (citing Anderson
Deel. at 17'.'"18).

3.

On March 31. 2011, Petitioner's legal pouches were taken, unopened to
the Warden's office where they were to be reviewed by the contract
attorneys. Id. at viii-ix (citing (Bussio Deel. at 4, 6)). See also Exs. 310,

10

Exhlblt Three (3) Is Respondents• Exhibit It is a copy of a letter dated April 1, 2011,. issued by
Mr. Angerhoffer notifying Petitioner that his legal. pouches were reviewed by the contract attorneys and his
material would be separated, as applicable, Into one of four categories. Petitioner was advised nqt to mix
materials deemed •privileged legal• with other materials. There is no Indication in the April 1, 2011, as to
how Petitioner's materials were categorized.

s

411 ; (Anderson Deel. Ex. B); (Bigelow Deel. at 4-6); (Bussio Deel. Exs. A12).

4.

After the contract attorneys reviewed and categorized Petitioner's legal
materials on April 1, 2011, (Resp't's Exs. 3-4), (Anderson Deel. Ex. C13),
the materials, none being classified as "legal-privileged."14 were provided
to the Warden on April 4, 2011. Id. at x; see also (Bigelow Deel. 4-6).

5.

On April 4, 2011, Mr~ Anderson reviewed the "legaf...public" pouches in the

Warden's office to ·retrieve the GRAMA protected documents he ·
inadvertently provided to Petitioner. Jg. ·(citing (Anderson De~I. at 23, 2531 ), (Bigelow Deel. at 9-11).

6.

After Mr. Ande"rson removed his documents,·Mr. Larry Bussio was
·contacted to return P~titioner's materials to him. Id. at 1O(citing Bussio

Deel. at 11)·
In light ·of the foregoing, the Court considers the "legal materialsn as addressed in
fo~tn·ote seven (1). See supta·tn~ ·1.

11
Exhibit Four (4) is Respondents' Exhibit It is a copy of a letter dated May 4, 2011, issued by
Wayne A. Freestone, contract attom~y. reviewing with .P~tltioner that the only type of legal material~ found
in the seized legal· materials were considered ~legal pubnc• materials. Petitioner was also notified that
lnfonnation as to the type of legal materials found was shared with UOC staff.

12

Chain of Custody log reflecting: (1) lnittal seizure of Petitioner's legal materials by Captain Paul
Gardner 9n Marcil 30, 2011: (2) sea.ire storage Qf said materials also on Maroh ~o. 2011; (3) remova.I of
the materials to the Warden's office on March 31, 2011; (4) rebieval of the materials from the Warden's
office on APrll 4, 2011: and, (5) return of the materials to Petitioner on April 5, 2011.
13

Provision FDr14/02.10 $Ubsec;tions {F) and(~) respectively, of the UDC rul~s provides Chat
•tegal-prfyileged" pouches •may be inspected, but the contents shall not be read[,]° while~ "legal-public·
pouches "shall be subject to normal Inspection rules and have no privilege against reading.•
.

14

Defined as •attorney-client correspondence and other non-public material Which would
compromise the Inmate's legal position If disclosed." (Anderson Deel. Ex. C, FDr14/02.10(O)(2)).
6

R .t I

Petitioner's Exhibit One (1) is not subject for privilege under the work product
doctrine. It is a memorandum dated February 8, 2011, generated by the contract
attorneys informing Petitioner that zero (0) copies were provided. Although there is a
hand written note at the bottom. the note indicates solely a mistake on copy expenses.
There is no indication as to the party that authored the note. This single line does not
constitute Petitioner's or the contract attorneys' legal plans, strategies. or tactics.
Petitioner's Exhibit Two (2) contains two memoranda issued by the contract
attorneys. The first, dated January 7, 2011, provides Petitioner procedural guidance
~

and does not refer to any matter, subject, or issue specifically. This.does not fit within
. the fact work pr~duct or opinion work product standard.
The second memorandum dated March. 17, 2011, again provides Petitioner with
procedural guidance and clarification _as to the type of materials ·that can be provided to
Petitioner by the contract attorney~.

This memorandum is inconsistent with· opinion

work product. Moreover;. while it does reference the Utah Procurement Act, this single
reference alone would not satisfy the three-pronged work product doctrine standard. It
was not "prepared for use in pending or imminent litigation." S. Utah Wilderness
Alliance. 2008 UT at ff 25 (citation omitted).
Petitioner's Exhibit Four (4)15 is a hand-written letter drafted by Petitioner and
directed to the contract attorneys. The letter dated September 1, 2010, addresses
. Petitioner's efforts in preparing an initial pleading including requests for case law.
Because this letter addresses Petitioner's legal plans, it would qualify as work product.
15

Petitioner's materials submitted for in camera review does not contain an exhibit marked as "3.

11
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However, the contract attorneys were the parties that initially reviewed and categorized
Petitioner's legal pouches. see supra 5-6, and then forwarded only the "legal-public"
materials. Id. There is no contrary evidence that would suggest Mr. Anderson either
saw Petitioner's September 1,- 2010, letter to the contract attorneys or, that the contract
attorneys disclosed the contents of said fetter to Mr. Anderson. ·See (Anderson Deel. at

-14-15, 24-31); (-Bussio Deel. Ex. 8). See also S. Utah Wildemess-Alliance, 2008 UT at

11 33 ("fl1he mere existence of an attomet-client relationship does not ipso facto-make
all communications between them confidential. a (citations and quotation~ omitted)).
Petitioner's Exhibit Five (5) is also a handwritten letter dated September 11,

2010, directed to the contract attorneys. The fetter is brief and addresses Petitioner's
expectations of the contract attorn~ys in light of the UDC contract. Because it primarily
involves t~e terms of the ~efationship be.tween Petitioner and the.contract-attorneys and
the steps Petitioner expects· the contract attorneys to fulfill, it does not fall within the
work product doctrine standard and/or·the attorney-client privilege1~•. See:· Gold
Standard, Inc. v. Am. Barrick Res. Com., 801 P.2d 909, 911--912 (Utah 1990)(citafions

omitted).
Petitioner's Exhibit Six (6) is a handwritten list. There is neither a date nor an
indication as to the author of the list. Regardless, it would likely qualify as a work
product because it is likely the reflection of Petitioner's strategy, plan or tactics.
However, because the contract attomeys were the fil"$t parties to review and categorize

1
e-[1]0 rely on the attomey~ientprivilege, a party must establish: (1) an attorney-client
~latfonship, (2) the transfer of confidential information, and (3) the purpose of the transfer was to obtain
legal advice... S. Utah Wilderness Alliance. 2008 UT at 1f33.

8
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Petitioner's materials and forwarded ~nly the "legal-public" pouches, there is no
indication that Mr. Anderson saw or read the list

See (Anderson Deel. at 14-15, 24-

31 ); (Bussio Deel. Ex. B).

In regards to the "Chase proposaln and "Shreve letters," Mr. Anderson issued a

letter to Petitioner on April 5, 2011, addressing the inadvertent disclosure of said
materials to the Petitioner. (Anderson Deel. Ex. E). Mr. Anderson explained, in part,
that the documents related to a Request for Proposal ("RFP"), which was commenced

in 2006, were inadvertently provided to Petition~r in contraindication to GRAMA. Id.

The "Chase proposal" is ~ bid proposal and is therefore, a protected record con~istent

with Utah Code Annotated Section 63G-2--305(1 ), (2) (2011 ). Id. The "Shreve letters"
included 11ames of individuals, who scored the RFPs, and the relevant scores given to

parties submitting ·RFPs and therefore, is also deemed protected as per Section 63G"'.'2305(6). Id. Petitioner was pto\1,id~ with. a wod< product log identifying the specific

documents "retrieved and ~ redacted version of the "Shreve letters." Id.
Neither the "Chase ptopo$.ala nor "Shreve letters" qualify as Petitioner's work
product First, these do~uments were provided by Mr. Anderson to Petitioner
inadvertently. (Anderson Deel. at 16). Mr. Anderson was therefore, aware of the
contents of the documents. Petitioner does not dispute this fact. Additionally. after
reviewing the noted documents in camera, -the Court finds that said documents were
prepared during the ordinary course of business proceedings and not in anticipation of
litigation. S~ S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 2008 UT at 1{ 25 (explaining that

documen~s produced in the ordinary course of business are not deemed work product
9

(citations omitted)).
Finally, Petitioner fails to assert how the alleged actions of Mr. Anderson and the

contract attorneys "breeched [sic] the confidentiality of Petitioner's legal actions in this
action" and "taints the proceedings." (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 3-5). The letter issued by
Mr. Anderson to Virginia Smith of Zions Bankcorporation, followed a telephone
conversation initiated by Ms. Smith to Mr. Anderson, a "few weeks" before April 6, 2011.
(Anderson D~cl. Ex. A). The letter references Petitioner's complaint filed with the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") against Zions. Id.
This. Court has already determined, see supra 3-9, that the d.ocuments asserted
as privileged by Petitioner were either not protected and/or were not disclosed to· Mr.
Anderson. Furth~rmore, Petitioner does not claim .that his request for relief with either
this Court or
the. OCC was
denied .pursuant
.to the alleged
.
.
..
, .breach of his "legal
,

materials.11 Nor does:.,Petition~r assert ·that.he has missed Go,y.rt elates, was otherwise
unable to make·timely filings, or was barred access to the courts due to the alieged
bre~ch. See e.g .. Clemmons v•. Davies, f36 F.3d 1166, *417 (10th Cir. 1996).

Based uppn the foregoing, the Court finds: (1) the documents claimed to be
privileged by Petitioner do not fall under the work product doctrine; (2) the alleged

11

•c1Jn instances in which a prison·er aH~es that the seizure of legal materials has deprived him of
his constitutional right of a ~ to the courts~ut does not allege a complete denial of access to legal
resources~e mf!$f establls~ that he has been prejudiced by the defendant's actions In order to pravall. • .
• (l]he §eventh. qlrcutl exptalned the required showing of prejudfce· as some quantµm of detriment
caused by the,cflafl~ns,ed conduct ot,tate officials resulting in the lntemsption and/or d~lay ofplalntiffs
pending or contemplated .tJtlgation. This definition of prejudice does not mean that the prisoner must show
that, absent the actions of corrections offldals, he would have prevall(!d In the underlying case. However,
the pfisoner's prosectitlon of the underlying action must b.e affirmatively hindered in some significant way;
there must be actual substantial prejudice to specific litfgatio·n.• (citations and quotations
omitted)(emphasfs added).
·
·
10
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privileged documents were neither disclosed to nor seized by Mr. Anderson;· (3) the
contract attorneys did not disclose alleged privileged materials to Mr. Anderson or
otherwise breach 18 Petitioner's confidential information; and, (4) Petitioner has failed to
demonstr~te that he was prejudiced by the alleged breach.
2

Disqualification

Petitioner claims that because Mr. Anderson and the contract attorneys both
gained access to his legal materials, the AG should be disqualified pursuant to "shared
confidences." (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 5-6 (citing State v. McCellan. 2008 UTApp 48,
179 P.3d 825) 19).

The relevant facts of'the McClellan matter center on defendant's former defense
counsel who, before Mr. McClellan's trial, left private practice and was serving in the
Utah County Attorney's Office, the entity that was conducting Mr. McClellan's
prosecution. 200~ ·UT at.114. <;>n the matter of the effect of the "cpnflict of interest"
created when the fonner defense counsel became associated·with the public office
.J>.

responsible for Mr. McClellan's prosecution, the Utah Supreme C~urt held thatin such

an instance it would not adopt a per se rule of disqualification.

Jg. at 1( 19. Rather, the

McClellan court looked to the rule it adopted in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah

1
_ 8Petitioner does not assert Qr argue a distinct breach of attorney-client privilege claim against the
conttact attorneys. (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 3-6). Rather, Petitioner argues that (1) the AG and the contract
attom,ys breached his. confidenti~lity, (2)· Mr. Anderson and the contract attorneys threat~n to tainUhe
proceedings, and, (3) the AG and the contractor should be dlsqualiijed. lg. The claim for disqualification
.of thf! contract attorneys Is n~ a~d wa$ not asserted In his Motion to Recuse.· (Pet'r's Opp. to Mot to
Dismiss, Mot to Recuse 6). Disqualification was not a claim in Petitioner's initial Petition.
1

9This case was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. McClellan. 2009 UT 50, 216 P.3d

956.

II

1992), which prohibited a· part-time city prosecutor from assisting in the defense of an
accused because such "dual representation would jeopardizeD the vital interests· of the
criminal justice system. Id. at 1J 20 (quotations omitted). The McClellan court in
0

adopting the rule established in Brown, were also guided by the Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 1.9(a) (2009), and Rule 1.10. The court expla.ined:
[UJn~er rule 1.9(a), a tanner defense attorney is prohibited from
participating in the prosecution of his or her former client "in the same or a
substantially related matter" absent that client's "informed consent,
confirmed in writing." Utah Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 1.9{a) (2009).
Ordinarily,, s_uch a ·conflict of intere~t is attributed to all members of a
disqualified attorney's finn. Id. R. 1.1 o. However, the Rules of
Professional C()nduct contemplate th~t the confli~ need· not be generally
attri~uted if "the personally disqualified lawyer is tim.ely screened from any
participation ,n the matter and is apportiqned no parf of the fee therefrom."
Id. R.1.-10{c)(1 )". ·While thi~ role applies specifically only to attorneys
working.irtthe private s~ctor, it demonstrates our preference for screening
<>¥er per se disqualification of ·an entire group of associated attorneys..
Id.· at ,r 21 (emph~sis added).· _·

The curre_nt version· of Rule 1.9 provides in relevant part:_·

. (a)A iawyer Who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereaft~r -represent another perso~ in the same -or a substantially
related matter In which that person's interests are materially adverse to
the intere·sts of the formetclient unless the former client gives informed
consent. confirmed in writing.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or
a substantially related matter in which a firm with whfch·the lawyer
formerlywas associated had previously represented a client
(b)(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(b)(2) ab9ut whom the lawyer had acquired information protected
by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is.material to the matter; unless the
- former client gives informed con$ent, confinned ·in writing.
·
(2013)(emphasis added).
Rule 1.10 also provides, in relevant part:

r··,

~
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(c) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer
associated in the finn shall knowingly represent a person in a matter in
which that lawyer is disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless:
(c){1) the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom, and
{c)(2) written notice is promptly given to any affected fonner client
(e) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former
or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.1120 •
(f) An office of government lawyers who serve as counsel to a
governmental entity such as the office of the Utah Attorney General, the
United States Attorney, or a district, county, or city attorney does not
constitute a "fiim" for purposes of Rule 1. 10 conflict imputation.
(emphasis added).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that neither McClellan nor Rules 1.9,
t.10, or 1.11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to Petitioner's claim. First,

neither Mr. Anderson, nor any other member of the AG, has represented or is currently
representing Petitioner in the entitled matter. Petitioner concedes this in his Reply
·Memorandum. (Pefr's ReplyMem. 7). See also Utah St. Bar Eth. Op. No. 142, 1994

WL 579850 (approved Mar. 10. 1994){addressing the issue of disqualification of the

20

Provides in relevant part
(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly penni~ a lawyer serving as a public
officer or employee:
(d)(1) Is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and
(d)(2) shall not
(d){2)(i) participate in a matter ln which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental
employment. unless the. appropriate government agency gives Its
lnfonned-consent. confirmed In writing; or
(d)(2)(ii) negotiate for private empl~ymenfwith any person who is involved as a
party or as lawyer for a party In a matter In which the lawyer is participating
personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law cterk to a
judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private
employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to· the conditions stated In
Rule 1.12(b).
13

.

entire office of the Attorney-General). Moreover, the contract attorneys are
independent contractors, not employees of the UDC or the State of Utah, (Anderson
Deel. Ex. B, p.6, at 15), who were C(?ntracted to provide as~istance to UDC inmates
generally, in the drafting and filing of pleadings. ·Id. at pp. 8-10. While Petitioner has
included Mr. Anderson and the contract attorneys as Respondents, as well as, the UDC
and individual employees of the UDC, no evidence has been provided that because Mr.
Anderson and the contract attorneys are Respondents, as well as, "opposing counsel1121

that there is an Inherent conflict of interest .or "shared confidences. "22
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, the C~urt HEREBY·OENIES Petitioner's Motion

to

Disqualify. Furthe~ore, cons,stent with the holding ii'.' Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d
467,474 (Utah 1992)~ Petitioner's Motion for Award of Costs is also QENIED.
This: Ruling stands as ·the Order of the Court No, further order is required~
Dated this 19th day of January, 2014.

.BY THE COURT:

21

1n the entitled matter, Ms. Amanda N. Montague of the Office of the Attomey General, is serving
as counsel for Respondents.
'D.As previously ad~ressed, Hf! supra pp~ 3-11, P~tltioner failed to present any evidence that the
·contract attorneys disclosed any of his alleged privileged legal materials to Mr. ~derson.
14
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy Qf the foregoing Ruling dated
this

-1l

day of January. 2014, postage prepaid, to the following:

Reginald WiHiams
Inmate No. 4620
Utah State. Prison
P~O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

Amanda ·N •. Montagu~
OFFICE OF' THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. Box 140812
160 ~ast 300 SQuth
Salt
Lake City, UT 84114-0812
.
.

CLERK OF COURT~
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ADDENDUM ''B''

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

. IUl O1.!fJf'f
SALT LAKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKf!-CO! INTY
STATE OF UTAH

·
Deputy Clerk

REGINALD WILLIAMS,
Petitioner.
vs.
RULING

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, ALFRED C. BIGELOW,
STEVE TURLEY, CRAIG BALLS,
LARRY.BUSSIO, MICHELLE
BARTLETT, CAPTAIN GARDNER, MIKE
HADDON, THOMAS PATTERSON,
GINA PROCTOR, GARY SESSIONS,
DAVID J. ANGERHOFFER, WAYNE A.

Case No. 110918680
Judge: L.A. DEVER

FREl;STONE. and MATTHEW B.
ANDERSON,
Respondents. ·
The above matter is before the Court on Petitioners Second Amended Petition
for Extraordinary Relief pursuant to Utah Rules·of Civil Procedure Rule 658, filed June
2, 2014.

Background
Petitioner submits the ten (10) causes of action as per Subsections 65B(d)(2) 1, in
particular Subsections (d}(2)(B) and (d)(2)(C). Petitioner maintains that his "interests
are threatened by the ...- acts of Respondentsn as follows:

1

Provides in relevant part

Appropriate relief may be granted: •.. (B) where an inferior court, administrative
agency, corporation or person has failed to perfonn an act required by law as a duty of
Qffice, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or
person has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the
petitioner is entitled[.]

--

~v
1.

The Contractor charged the Petitioner fees to photocopy legal materials
without authorization.

2.

The Contractor and the Utah Department of Corrections ("UDC") refuse to
<dv

provide the Petitioner constitutionally mandated legal assistance.

3.

The UOC refuses to regulate the Contractor's compliance with the terms
of the Agreement. .

4.

The Contractor refuses to provide the Petitioner case law, court rules and

G~

statutes to research and litigate Petitioner's meritorious claims.

5.

Failing to develop and implement policies to provide altemative· tegal
assistance when a conflict of interest exist between the Petitioner and the
Contractor threatens the Petitioner's right to receive mandated legal
assistance.

6.

The Contractor's faifure to prepare notice(s) of claim denied ~etiti~ner
access to court.

7.

UDC's failure to place·tfie· Inmate Trust Fund Account ("l"FFA") out for bid
threatens ,he Petitioner's fund$ held in the Inmate Trust Fund Account,
with loss or misuse.

8.

UDC officials falsification of official records threatens the Petitioner's right
to have accurate information about him in government files and denies
Petitioner meaningful governmental· redress of grievances.

9.

The Contractor's refusal to prepare petitions for records request appeals
under the Governmental Records Access Management Act, for filing in
the Third District Court, ~gainst the UDC, violates the Petitioner's right.to
governmental redress and access to the courts.

10.

Confiscation of Petitioner's legal material violated UDC's regulations and
2

(di,,

Petitioner's right to privacy.
Discussion and Analysis
In considering petitions for extraordinary relief. the Utah Supreme Court held, "A
[Rule 658] petition of any nature which fails to state a claim may be dismissed ....
despite the lack of express authority to dismiss frivolous petitions under [65B{d)]."
Lancasterv. Utah Board of P~rdons. 869 P.2d 945, 948 (Utah 1994). See also
Williamsv. Dep'tofCorr.• 2013 UT App 159, 11102 , 306 P.3d 821. In light of said
standards, the Court considers Petitioner's claims3 •

Claim 1.

The Contractor charged the Petitioner fees to photocopy legal
materials without authorization.

Petitioner's claim fails

to satisfy the required pleading standard. That is. a

petitioner's "obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more

thati labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a- cause of
action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.ff Bell Atl. Corp~ v. Twombly, 550 U~S. 544, 555(2007)(citations and
quotations omitted).

2

Holding:

Williams has not shown that the trial court erred in treating the entire petition as one brought
under rule 65B. In particular, he identifies no authority pennitting claims for ordinary relief to be
bundled with daims for extraordinary relief in a single hybrid petition. A proceeding under rule 658
is an extraordinary proceeding with Idiosyncratic procedural rules. A hybrid complaint would thus
require the trial court to simultaneously-apply two different procedural regimes. Because this
approach is unworkable, the trial (;OUrt had discretion to dismiss from a petition for extraordinary
relief any claims seeking ordinary relief.

(citations omitted)(emphasis added).
3
Although Petitioner referenced various exhibits throughout his Petition, he failed to attach any of
the noted exhibits to the Petition received by this Court

3

Claim 2.

The Contractor and the Utah Department of Corrections ("UDC'7
refuse to provide the Petitioner constitutionally mandated legal
assistance.

The Supreme Court has declared that "an. inmate's right of access does not
require the state to supply legal assistance beyond the preparation of initial pleadings in

a civil rights action regarding current confinement or a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus." Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613, 617 (10th Cir. 1995)(citing Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.~. 817, 828 n.17 (1977))(emphasis added); Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d
397,399 (10~ Cir. 1987)("The Utah_prison's legal assistance program adequately
assists all inmates in the preparation and filing of initial pleadings.") Petitioner
concedes this in his petition paragraph eleven (11 ), "The Agreement requires the
Contractor to assist prisoners in drafting and filing pleadings(.]" (Second Am. Pet. 11 ).
Accordingly, any claims by Petitioner that the µoc and/or Contractor failed to conduct
legal research on Pe~itioner's behalf_are HEREBY STRICKEN, see e.g. at°ld.1(1115, 17,
18, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, and Petitioner's Claim TWO (2) is appropriately DISMISSED.
Claim 3.

The LJDC refuses to regulate the Contractors compliance with the
terms of the Agreement.

Petitioner's primary allegation under his third claim is that the Contractor failed to
"conduct research, prepare pleadings, provide legal research materials and perform
photocopy duties," and ·such failures "hinder[], delay[], and obstructa the Petitioner's
access to the courts. (Second Am. Pet. p. 6).
As not~d above, the Petitioner's "right of access does not require the state to
supply legal assistance beyond the preparation of initial pleadings[.]" Camer, 54 F.3d
at 617 (citation omitted).· Moreover, to successfully assert a claim for denial of access
to the courts, an inmate must show (1) the inadequacy of the legal.assistance
4
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furnished, and (2) an "actual injury" resulting from the assistance. Lewis v. Casey. 518
U.S. 343, 349 (1996). To satisfy the "actual injury" requirement a petitioner must show
"that the denial of legal resources hindered the prisoner's efforts to pursue a
nonfrivofous claim." Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir.1996). Finally,
the non-frivolous claims involved must be "habeas corpus or civil rights actions

regarding cun-entconfinement." Carper. 54 F.3d at 616 (emphasis added); Northern v.
Barnes, 825 P.2d 6.96, 698 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) afrd, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 19-93) ("In
general, the purpose of extraordinary relief under Rule 658 is to test the lawfulness of
imprisonment, and the propriety of any related proceedings(.]" (citation omitted)).
Petitioner has failed to establish that he sustained any actual injury.
First, although Petitioner maintains that his claims described in paragraphs
twelve (12) are barred by the statute of limitations. (Second Am. Pet. p. 4), he fails to
reference any particular statute. Id. at 1(19. Moreover, contrary to P~titioner's claim.
while "petitions filed under [R]ule 658(d) ... should be filed within a reasonable time
after the act complained of has been done or refused, there is no fixed limitation period
governing the time for filing them." Nicolds v. Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 2012 UTApp
123, ,r 3, 277 P.3d 652 (citing Renn v. Bd. of Pardons. 944 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah
1995)(quotations omitted)).
In addition, despite the fact that Petitioner was notified by the Contractor that his
liFA claims were frivolous on or about May 9, 2013, (Second Am. Compl.1(1J 15, 25),
he continues to allege that due to the Contractors "hinderence [sic], delay, and
obstruction ... Petitioner has experienced a more than 3-year deley (sic] in filing his
ITFA claims." Jg. at ,r 19.. Petitioner has not demonstrated that his ITFA claims are
appropriate as a claim for extraordinary relief. See Northern. 825 P.2d at 698.
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioners Claim Three (3) is DISMISSED.

s
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Claim 4.

The Contractor refuses to provide the Petitioner case law, court
roles and statutes to research and litigate Petitioner's meritorious
claims.

B~cause Petitioner_ is not entitled to legal assistance beyond the preparation of
initial pleadings, see supra 4, Petitioner's Claim Four (4) is DISMISSED.
Claim 5.

Failing to qevelop and implement policies to provide alternative
legal assistance when a conflict of intere$t exist between the
Petitioner and the Contractor threatens the Petitioner's tight to
receiv_e mandated legal assistance.

Petitioner's claim five (5) primarily alleges that "only the Contractor can identify a
conflict of interest to the uoc· [and] [a]s such, the UDC has notmeehanism forth~
Petitioner to receive legal assistance to bring the claims-alleged E;iga_inst the Contractor
in this petition~" (Second Am. Pet. 1J 29). Pet,tioner's claim is· self:00ntradictory. That
is,. while· Petitio~er as~erts that without legal assistance he cannot assert claims against
the Contractor, the petitions.filed by Petitioner, including the Second Amended Petition,
contain Petitiol)_ef.s.claims asserted_.against the Contractor.. See e.g~
(Second
Am~ Pet.,
.
.

Claims I, II,. IV, VI, IX). Accordingly, Petitioner's Claim Five-(5) is DISMISSED.
Claim 6.

The Contractors failure

to prepare notice(s) of·c/aim denied

Petitioner access to court.
Petitioner's sixth claim stems from the alleged confiscation of his legal papers on

or about March 31, 2011. (Second Am. Pet. p. 10-11). In particular, _Petitioner alleges
that "[o]n May 16, 2011, [he] submitted a draft notice of [a] claim and a_ request for

preparation to the Contractor. regarding confiscation of his legal papers. See Ex. X4•

4

See fn. 3.
6

[However], (o]n May 16, 2011, the Contractor refused to prepare the notice of claim."
Id. at 10.
Petitioner has failed to establish that ( 1) a claim under the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-101 et. seq., is an appropriate claim for
extraordinary relief; and, (2) that the Contractor's refusal to prepare Petitioner's notice
of claim is consistent with the standard of a violation to access to the courts. See
supra pp. 4-5. Moreover. ·despite the fact that Petitioner's allegations surrounding the
confiscation of his papers were not filed as a claim under the· Governmental Immunity
Act of Utah, Petitioner's allegations were addressed by this Court in its Ruling of
January 21, 2014.
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner's Claim .Six (6) is DISMISSED.

Claim 7.

UDC's failure to place the ITFA out for bid threatens the Petitioner's
funds held in the ·1nmat~ Trost Fund Account, with loss or misuse.

Because Petitioner has not demonstrated that his ITFA claims are appropriate as
a claim -for extraordinary relief, s~ supra pp. 4-5, Petitioner'~ Claim Seven (7) is

_DISMISSED.
Claim 8.

UDC officials falsification of official records threatens the
Petitioner's right to have accurate information about him in
government files and denies Petitioner meaningful governmental
redress of grievances.

Petitioners eighth claim stems from the UDC official's alleged confiscation of
Petitioner's legal papers on March 30, 2011, and the related·chain of custody sheet,
which reflects the possession of said papers by UOC officials. (Second Am. Pet. pp.

12--13). Petitioner asserts in relevant part, that "[a]s a result of falsification of the chain
of custody sheet and the IR-2 document, the integrity of litigation is compromised by
7

B~ssio's· deliberate attempt to conceal Anderson's ·possession, reading and seizure of
Petitioner's legal materials.• Id. at 1( 38.
The Court finds that Petitioner's eighth claim is an attempt of Petitioner to reargue his Motion to "Recuse"5, filed October 4, 2011, and Motion to Disqualify Counsel,
filed Augus~ 6, 2013, which the Court addressed in its Ruling of January 21, 2014.
Accordingly, it is STRICKEN.

Claim 9.

The Contractor's refusal to prepare petitions for records request
appeals under the Governmental Records Access Management
Act, for filing in. the Third District Court, against the UDC, violates
the Petitioner's right to governmental redress and access to the
courts.

· Petitioner has· failed to dem·onstrate that the· denial of GRAMA rectuests are
appropriate extraordin-~ry claims under Rule 658, see Nodhem, 825 P.2d .at 698, and
therefore, Claim Nine (9) is STRICKEN.

Claim 10.

Confiscation of Petitioner's legal material violated UDC's
regulations and P_etitioner's right ~o privacy~

Because the Court finds that Petitioner's· tenth. claim is an attempt of Petitjoner to
r&-argue his Motion to "RecusenG, filed October 4, 2011, and Motion to DJsqualify
Counsel, filed August 6, 2013, which the Court addressed in its Ruling of January 21,
2014, it is STRICKEN.

5

Petitioner misconstrues the tenn •recuse," In the context of Petitioner's Motion,· Petitioner was
requesting the Court to •disqualify' the relevant party ·as counsel.
6

Seefn. 5.
8
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Conclusion
Based upon the Court's determin•ation of Petitioner's individual claims in his
Second Amended Petition, ·as discussed above, and whereas some of Petitioner's
claims are not in compliance with Rule 65B, i.e., include ordinary claims for relief, see

also (Ruling, May 6, 2014,

p. 3-4

7
),

Petitioner's Second Amended Petition is HEREBY

DISMISSED.
ihis Ruling stands as the Order of the Court. No further order is required.

Dated-this 30th day of June, 2014".

BY THE COURT:

7
The Court (1) ordered Petitioner to submit his second. amended petition in strict compliance with
Rule 658 and, (2) did strike Petitioner's First Amended Petition in its entirety for including ordinary claims.
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